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Abstract. In this work we address the challenge for an IT service customer to 
select the cost-optimal service among different offers by external providers. We 
describe the customer’s optimization problem by considering the negative mon-
etary impact of potential service incidents on its business. First, we demonstrate 
that the information currently used in service level agreements may lead to 
suboptimal customer decisions. Second, we discuss how providers’ private in-
formation about the behavior of service delivery environments could be lever-
aged by the customer when selecting service offers. Third, we propose a pro-
curement auction as a mechanism to optimize total cost for the customer – 
choosing from different service offers by risk-neutral providers. In introducing 
this approach, we suggest that customers and providers collaborate to define 
service performance measures, which allow providers to better tailor service of-
fers to customers’ business requirements. 
Keywords: Service Level Management, Service Level Agreement, Adverse 
Business Impact, Service Incident, Procurement Auction 
1 Introduction 
Outsourcing of IT services is popular and growing. The worldwide revenue generated 
with outsourcing totaled $246.6 bn in 2011 – an increase of 7.8 percent compared to 
2010 [1]. But in spite of the increasing significance of outsourced IT services, there 
are still opportunities for improvement (see, e.g., [2-3]). 
In this work we address the business and IT alignment challenge (see, e.g., [4]) for 
an IT service customer to select the cost-optimal service among different offers by 
external providers. We describe the customer’s optimization problem by considering 
the negative monetary impact of potential service incidents on its business. 
Typically, the provision of outsourced services is governed by a service level 






throughput, response time, and service outages. We focus on service outages of end-
to-end services, which directly affect the customer’s business performance; however, 
our findings can in many cases be generalized to also cover other performance dimen-
sions. 
In practice, performance requirements for system outages are typically expressed 
by two specifications: the minimum availability of the service over a given period of 
time and the maximum duration of any single service outage incident (see, e.g., [5]). 
For example, the minimum availability might be expressed as 99% uptime every 
month and the maximum incident duration might be specified as 30 minutes. Let us 
call this requirements specification method the (min, max) regime, where the target 
values for min and max are called service level objectives (SLOs). 
We address two primary research questions in this paper: First, we analyze why the 
(min, max) method of performance specification of service outages leaves purchasers 
under-informed and why, as a consequence (under reasonable assumptions), decisions 
based on this method may be significantly suboptimal. We discuss how providers’ 
private information about the behavior of service delivery environments could be 
leveraged by the customer when selecting service offers. Second, we examine how 
the customer could optimize its total cost in choosing from different service offers by 
risk-neutral providers. We propose a procurement auction as a mechanism to support 
customers in determining the cost-optimal solution to their optimization problem 
considering the negative monetary impact of potential service incidents on their  
business. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews related 
literature. We introduce the base scenario, which we address later on, in Section 3. In 
Section 4, we analyze the monetarily quantified negative impact of selected incident 
duration distributions on the performance of a customer business process. We discuss 
how a provider could support the customer in solving its decision problem in Section 
5. In Section 6, we propose a service procurement auction approach that enables the 
customer to select its cost-optimal service solution. Finally, Section 7 summarizes and 
discusses our approach, and outlines the next steps towards application of these ideas 
in industry. 
2 Related Work 
We conducted a literature review following the methodology proposed by Webster 
and Watson [6]. In an extensive forward and backward search without temporal re-
striction, Google Scholar and CiteSeer served as our main sources of search. Key-
words used were ‘service level objective’, ‘service level agreement’, ‘service level 
management’, ‘optimal choice’, ‘business impact’, ‘incident management’, ‘decision 
theory’ and ‘customer’ as well as combinations thereof. 
Focusing on the research field of IT (outsourcing) we found six papers – by Jin et 
al. [7], Sauvé et al. [8], Cheng et al. [9], Taylor and Tofts [10], Barroero et al. [11] 
and Franke [12] – which are related to our approach that aims to support the consider-






closely matches our scenario and approach. Our own prior work contains discussions 
of these papers and is more directly relevant:  
In [13] we discuss the customer’s optimization problem to select the cost-optimal 
SLA having concluded a long-term outsourcing contract with a single external pro-
vider. We propose a methodology to solve the optimization problem in a scenario 
without penalties. In [14] we extend that approach and discuss the customer’s optimi-
zation problem in a setting where a provider has to compensate the customer for every 
single service incident to occur. We propose a single-attribute procurement auction 
approach to identify and select the cost-optimal service offer out of different provid-
ers’ bids. In contrast to this work, our prior work does not consider the cases of pro-
viders bidding tuples of target values for service level indicators (i.e., performance 
measures) and a price (multi-attribute procurement auction) or of receiving incentive 
bonus payments for ‘better-than-promised’ performance. In [15] we propose a simula-
tion-based procedure to monetarily quantify the negative impact of single service 
incidents on the customer business. 
Furthermore, there are several areas of research complementary to our work: Tak-
ing a more technical perspective, Wittgreffe et al. [16] provide concepts aiming at the 
design of end-to-end SLAs that are directly targeted at business applications of the 
service customer. Breitgand et al. [17] present an SLA design approach which enables 
service providers to derive optimal response time SLOs for a service by analyzing 
historical performance data of the applied IT infrastructure. Blau et al. [18] use a mul-
tidimensional procurement auction to determine the socially efficient service compo-
sition in a service value network aiming at the maximization of welfare. 
Summing up, none of the related works closely matches our scenario and approach, 
namely: (i) We monetarily measure the negative business impact of service offers by 
(ii) quantifying the incurred business cost resulting from the occurrence of combina-
tions of service incidents and (iii) explicitly considering business cost functions which 
do not develop linearly with service performance attributes. We do this in a setting in 
which providers have private information they do not want to disclose (iv). 
3 Base Scenario 
In our base scenario, which we address later on, a customer company wants to pur-
chase an end-to-end IT service from an external service provider to support a particu-
lar business process. This non-mission-critical, yet non-commodity service directly 
affects the customer’s business performance, i.e., it contributes measurably to the 
business value created. Competing providers are able to offer the particular service 
with different SLAs, i.e., at different service levels and different prices.  
We assume that all functional and non-functional properties (including base sizing) 
of the service, except for performance and price, have already been documented in a 
‘Request for Proposal’ (RfP). For this purpose, requirements of the business process 
to be supported have been considered. The RfP also states a fixed delivery duration, 






To define service performance the customer has specified a set of service level in-
dicators (performance measures), and associated service level objectives (target val-
ues). An SLA is represented by a tuple of service level objectives and a service price, 
which the customer will have to pay to the selected provider on a periodic basis for 
service provisioning. In the RfP, the customer has also defined penalty functions for 
each service level indicator. These specify the amount of money a provider will have 
to pay in case of service level breaches. Further, the RfP grants the customer the right 
of constant access to the monitoring information that the provider collects. 
To compare service providers’ offers, we assume the customer will estimate and 
monetarily quantify the negative impact of imperfect service (at specific service lev-
els) on its business process. Also, the customer is assumed to consider its expectations 
of providers to achieve, to under- or even outperform the stated SLOs (cf. [13]). Us-
ing these ‘business cost’ estimates, the service price, as well as the expected penalty 
payments, the customer can assess the financial implications resulting from the selec-
tion of a specific SLA, i.e., it can determine total customer cost. We suppose that the 
rational customer in our setting aims to identify the cost-optimal service offer. 
Since customer and provider have agreed on a fixed delivery duration, capital 
budgeting approaches, such as the net present value method, can be applied to dis-
count cash flows (i.e., total customer cost) of several future reference periods. This 
allows the comparison of SLAs which state service prices and business cost changing 
over time, i.e., varying in different reference periods. For reasons of clarity, however, 
we will focus on a single reference period. 
4 The Adverse Business Impact of Service Incidents 
The (min, max) performance measures normally found in SLAs for specifying re-
quirements for service outages may be called aggregating and limiting service level 
indicators. An example: A logistics company C runs a high-bay warehouse with a 
management system that is operated and managed by the provider P as a service. 
This end-to-end service is defined to be available 99% of the time of a reference peri-
od [this is the SLO of the aggregating service level indicator min], whereas no single 
service incident may last longer than 30 minutes [this is the SLO of the limiting ser-
vice level indicator max]. 
The information lost in the aggregation may, however, have undesirable conse-
quences for making decisions – as will be illustrated in the following. Using these 
established service level indicators the customer has no information about the specific 
probabilities of a service to achieve, to under- or even outperform the stipulated 
SLOs. Consequently, the customer is not able to determine with any precision the 
business cost resulting from the selection of an SLA. Even if the service level objec-
tive combinations of aggregating and limiting service level indicators are exactly met, 
customers may not be able to determine the adverse business impact. Let us see why.  
Adverse business impact, resulting in business cost, is caused by each service inci-
dent (SI), i.e., by each ‘unplanned interruption’ to a service or ‘reduction in the quali-






definition of ‘incident’ in [19]). We use business cost functions to describe the busi-
ness cost induced by a single service incident of a certain type with regard to its inci-
dent attribute values. These business cost functions may develop non-proportionally 
to service incidents’ attribute values, i.e., they do not need to increase or decrease 
linearly.  
Example (cont’d): The warehouse management system is used to locate goods in 
the high-bay warehouse that have to be taken out of stock and shipped by truck. Every 
five minutes, one truck arrives at the warehouse in order to be loaded. Outages of the 
warehouse management system (i.e., service incidents of the type ‘outage incidents’, 
which are described by the single attribute ‘outage duration’) interrupt this workflow. 
For each minute a truck has to wait to be loaded, C incurs business cost of € 1. Fig-
ure 1 shows how C’s aggregated business cost increases with longer outage dura-
tions.  
 
Fig. 1. Business cost of a single outage incident w.r.t. outage duration 
The blue triangles in Figure 1 represent the (discrete) business cost values of single 
outage incidents with respect to their duration.1 The red diamonds in Figure 1 de-
scribe the average business cost per minute an outage incident causes with respect to 
its duration.2 For instance, an outage incident that lasts 25 minutes induces business 
cost of € 75, i.e., average business cost of € 3 per minute of outage. 
When an aggregating service level indicator is used, the achieved service quality is 
calculated considering the values of a specific attribute of all service incidents of the 
same type (service incident class) that occur within a certain reference period. In or-
der to quantify business cost in case of moderately non-linear business cost func-
tions3, however, it is essential for the customer to understand which combination of 
incident attribute values actually realizes a specific achieved value (of an aggregating 
                                                           
1 The discrete business cost values (blue triangles) can be approximated by the continuous 
business cost function y=0.0999x²+0.3028x. 
2 The average business cost per minute values (red diamonds) can be approximated by the 
continuous function y=0.0975x+0.4786. 
3 We obtained our results below assuming a moderately non-linear business cost function. Due 
to space limitations we cannot report a full sensitivity analysis. The business cost function 






service level indicator). The distribution of single incidents’ attribute values, e.g., of 
their outage durations, has to be considered. 
To illustrate the potential consequences of different incident attribute value distri-
butions on business cost, we continue our example:  
We assume the provider to exactly achieve the target availability of 99% (i.e., 432 
minutes of total outage time within a month) and to avoid single service incidents 
lasting longer than 30 minutes.  
Let OT be the total outage time permitted and xmax be the maximum length of a sin-
gle outage incident. Furthermore, let xi be the length of outage i during the reference 
period T and let b(xi) = 0.0999xi² + 0.3028xi be the non-linear business cost function. 
Now assume xi ≤ xmax, 褐i, and, xi = xj, 褐i,j.  
If all outages occurring in T have the same duration xfix, this leads to significantly 
different total business cost for different values of xfix (see Table 1): 
Table 1. Different outage durations lead to significantly different business cost 
xfix b(xfix) 
number of incidents 
within T (rounded) 
total business cost 
caused within T 
10 € 13.02 43 €    559.77 
20 € 46.02 21 €    996.34 
30 € 98.99 14 € 1,385.92 
 
Having shown the impact of different outage durations using this simple calculation 
we can now discuss a more complex setting: Figure 2 shows the relative frequencies 
of different outage incident durations for selected beta-distributions4.  
 
Fig. 2. Relative frequencies of beta-distributed outage incident durations on the interval (0;30] 
                                                           
4 We chose the beta-distribution because it can be specified within definite limits, it is very 
flexible and is analytically tractable. The beta-distribution allows to model a large variety of 
incident behaviors of service delivery environments, e.g., that of an environment which is 






Since no single service incident may last longer than 30 minutes (SLO of the limiting 
service level indicator) the distributions are limited to the interval (0;30]. By assum-
ing the provider exactly meets the SLOs promised, we are able to calculate the busi-
ness cost a customer has to expect if these targets are realized through different beta-
distributions of single outage durations.  
We compute the following integral (see equation 1) for the given beta-distributions, 
where fBeta(x, g, く, 0, 30) is the probability density function of a beta-distribution 
which is limited to the interval (0;30] and gAvgBC/Min(x) describes the average business 
cost per minute (depicted as red diamonds in Figure 1): 
  (1) 
The probability density function is multiplied with the total outage duration, i.e., 432 
minutes, in order to obtain the time which is spent on a certain incident attribute val-
ue. Figure 3 shows the resulting business cost values.  
In case of non-constant marginal business cost functions, the customer has to con-
sider the distribution of incident attribute values (a target value of an aggregating 
service level indicator is realized through), since different distributions will usually 
lead to different business cost. 
 
Fig. 3. Expected business cost given different beta-distributions for single outage durations 
Even if the customer in our example knew that incident durations are beta-distributed 
and assumed a specific beta-distribution in order to estimate its expected business 
cost, this could lead to a significant misjudgment in case the customer selects inaccu-
rate beta-distribution parameter values.  
Table 2 shows the errors with regard to expected business cost (in percent) result-
ing from the assumption of a specific beta-distribution, while the actual outage dura-































B(5;30) 0.0 % 35.0 % 116.5 % 198.1 % 233.1 % 
B(5;15) -25.9 % 0.0 % 60.4 % 120.9 % 146.7 % 
B(5;5) -53.8 % -37.7 % 0.0 % 37.7 % 53.8 % 
B(15;5) -66.5 % -54.7 % -27.4 % 0.0 % 11.7 % 
B(30;5) -70.0 % -59.5 % -35.0 % -10.5 % 0.0 % 
 
Consequently, the definition of SLOs for aggregating and limiting service level indi-
cators is not sufficient to compare different service offers regarding the total business 
cost (and, thus, total customer cost) induced in the case of non-linear business cost 
functions.5 Performance measures have to consider the monetarily quantified negative 
business impact of service incidents instead of incident attribute values only.  
Furthermore, the example shows that it would be negligent from a customer point 
of view not to reflect distributions of incident attribute values in service level agree-
ments in case of moderately non-linear business cost functions. This idea, however, 
hinges on the providers’ ability to ascertain incident attribute value distributions at 
reasonable (additional) cost and, thus, price increases. 
5 Service Incident Patterns 
Providers usually possess private information about the service delivery environments 
(SDEs), i.e., combinations of organizational and technical service components they 
use to provide a service. Since outsourcing providers have many customers who pur-
chase similar services, they are able to collect data about the frequency of service 
incidents that occur when using a particular type of SDE, i.e., to establish service 
incident histories for each SDE. By analyzing these data, providers can predict the 
frequency distributions of service incidents of a specific type having certain incident 
attribute values, i.e., determine the SDEs’ characteristic ‘service incident patterns’. If 
the customer had the deep insight a provider has, it could use this information to bet-
ter address its optimization problem. In the following we will denote a tuple of attrib-
ute values of a single service incident as its service incident level (SIL), with the inci-
dent type determining the tuple structure. 
Considering one service incident type6 only, Table 3 illustrates a provider’s private 
knowledge of an exemplary service delivery environment e. It lists in schematic form 
                                                           
5 … even if we assume the service level objective combinations of aggregating and limiting 
service level indicators to be met. In practice, the stipulated SLOs might be even outper-
formed to certain degrees in different reference periods. 
6 Service incidents sharing the same set of (one or more) attributes are regarded to be of the 
same service incident type (e.g. outage incidents, reduced throughput incidents, etc.). Inci-
dents of the same service incident type affect the performance of a customer business pro-
cess in a similar manner, but may differ in their attribute values (e.g., in the duration of out-






the data records about the combinations of sequential service incidents (CoSIs) the 
provider has collected about this type of service delivery environment when using it 
(i) during past reference periods (ii) for one or several other customers. The function 
ft(SILa, b, …, n) describes the absolute frequency with which service incidents at the 
levels SILa, b, …, n occurred during a specific reference period, whereas the index t la-
bels a data record. We denote this table as CoSI/SIL frequency history.  
To continue with our example: A row CoSI2 in the CoSI/SIL frequency history 
could, for instance, document that there were five outage incidents with a duration in 
the interval (0;5) minutes (f2((0;5))=5), three incidents with a duration in the interval 
[5;10) minutes (f2([5;10))=3), … in the data record ‘2’.
 7 
Based on the information contained in the CoSI/SIL frequency histories, the pro-
vider determines the SDEs’ characteristic incident patterns (one pattern for each ser-
vice incident type), which state the expected (absolute) frequencies of service inci-
dents at the different service incident levels to occur within a reference period.8 
Table 3. A provider’s private knowledge of the incident characteristics of a specific service 
delivery environment e (CoSI/SIL frequency history) 
 
Absolute frequencies of SIs at a certain SIL (historical data) 





CoSI1 f1(SIL1,1, …,1) … f1(SIL1,1, …,n) … f1(SILa,b, …,n) 
CoSI2 f2(SIL1,1, …,1) … f2(SIL1,1, …,n) … f2(SILa,b, …,n) 
… … … … … … 
CoSIt ft(SIL1,1, …,1) … ft(SIL1,1, …,n) … ft(SILa,b, …,n) 
 
 
Providers have only little understanding of the business cost the customer incurs when 
a certain CoSI is realized. In our work we assume that the customer is able to describe 
business cost functions, which define the business cost caused by single service inci-
dents with respect to their specific service incident levels (SILs). That is, the customer 
can state (discrete) BusinessCost/SIL vectors for each service incident type.  
Example (cont’d): A customer’s BusinessCost/SIL vector for the service incident 
type ‘outage’ states that outages with a duration in the interval (0;5) minutes induce 
business cost of € 1.81, outages with a duration in the interval [5;10) minutes induce 
business cost of € 8.82, … 
Furthermore, in the following, we assume the customer discloses this information 
to selected providers, treating them as ‘trusted suppliers’. Knowing the customer’s 
BusinessCost/SIL vectors (one vector for each service incident type), providers can 
combine the information contained therein with their private knowledge of service 
delivery environments’ service incident patterns. In doing so, they are able to calcu-
                                                           
7 The classification of attribute values into attribute intervals reduces the number of service 
incident levels to be considered and, thus, improves the applicability of our approach. 







late (provider-internal) indicators describing their service delivery environments’ 
impact on the customer business process in terms of business cost. 
In order to determine the monetary adverse business impact – for a single service 
incident type and a certain service delivery environment – a provider multiplies the 
characteristic service incident pattern p with the BusinessCost/SIL vector b. Equa-
tion 2 formally describes this operation. 
  (2) 
The resulting value r represents the business cost value the customer would incur in a 
specific reference period for a specific type of incident. Assuming historical data to 
allow the prediction of service incident patterns to occur in future reference periods 
and service incident patterns to be stable – i.e., to have low variances with regard to 
frequencies of service incidents at certain SILs to occur – providers can arrive at ac-
curate business cost estimates. These measures reflect the adverse business impact a 
customer incurs in case of constant and non-constant marginal business cost func-
tions. Using this private information, providers can better understand the impact of 
their services on customers’ business and, thus, define their service offers  
accordingly. 
6 A Multi-Attribute Procurement Auction to Select  
Cost-optimal Service Offers 
Based on the constructs introduced in the previous sections, we develop a procedure 
enabling a customer to solve its optimization problem – given different service offers 
by risk-neutral providers. 
Today, a typical contract negotiation in IT outsourcing follows a structured ap-
proach [20]. First, by sending potential service providers a request for information, 
the customer identifies suppliers that offer the service in question. Afterwards, the 
customer defines a request for proposal specifying additional information about tech-
nical, economic and legal characteristics (sizing, mission-criticality, service partner-
ship models, etc.) and further reduces the number of potential partners before the 
actual negotiation process begins. 
Our proposal is to use a service procurement auction to conduct the negotiation. 
Auctions constitute a way to elicit bidders’ private information [21]. In our scenario 
we use an auction to allow the customer to draw conclusions regarding the providers’ 
reservation prices for delivering their services at characteristic service incident pat-
terns. Thus, we enable the customer to better compare different service offers. In pro-
curement auctions providers ‘compete for the right to sell’ their services [21]. 
For reasons of clarity, the method presented focuses on a single reference period 
only. As discussed in Section 3, capital budgeting approaches could be applied to 
compare multi-reference period service contracts, which state service prices and busi-






6.1 Definition of the Procurement Auction 
The objective of our approach is to compare service offers in order to identify and 
select the one that is minimizing the total customer cost. Therefore, we define an ‘op-
timal mechanism’ [21] for the procurement of the service. 
In the following, we assume the customer reveals its business cost functions to the 
selected providers participating in the procurement auction. Providers taking part in 
the procurement auction have to bid a tuple of service incident patterns (one pattern 
for each service incident type with regard to service incident levels predefined by the 
customer) and service price. 
A provider in our example, for instance, would bid a tuple consisting of an  
‘outage incident pattern’ p (stating the absolute frequencies for outage incidents at 
the different service incident levels to occur) and the service price it demands with 
regard to this pattern. 
We define the following two rules in order to make sure that providers have no in-
centive to state service incident patterns of SDEs untruthfully in their bids: 
If the amount of service incidents at a specific service incident level exceeds the 
number stated in the service incident pattern (i.e., a provider’s bid) we define that the 
future contractual partner will have to compensate the customer for every additional 
service incident to occur in the amount of business cost defined in the corresponding 
customer business cost function. Due to this ‘1:1’-penalty rate, providers would di-
rectly add the additional business cost to be expected (for all types of service inci-
dents) to their service prices.  
On the other hand, we define that the future contractual partner (provider) will be 
rewarded for every single incident at a specific SIL it avoids (with regard to the num-
ber specified in the service incident pattern) in the amount of business cost defined in 
the corresponding customer business cost function. Due to this ‘1:1’-bonus rate, pro-
viders in a competitive situation would give the customer a discount for business cost 
they expect to avoid considering future rewards. 
Since the customer has defined all types of service incidents in a way that these are 
independent of one another, providers will add up all expected penalties (positive) and 
rewards (negative) and the net service price to a single monetary value (the gross 
service price). As mentioned above, providers are supposed to bid a tuple of service 
incident patterns and gross service price. 
Therefore, we can use a multi-attribute auction to determine the cost-optimal ser-
vice offer for the customer. In such a ‘multi-attribute context’ where the customer 
reveals the negative impact of service incidents on its business and the providers have 
different ‘market expectations’, first-price auctions seem to achieve the best  
results [22]. 
Based on these findings, we define a multi-attribute, first-price, sealed-bid auction 
for our setting (see e.g., [21]). In our first-price auction, each provider is asked to 
submit one sealed bid, which states a tuple of service incident patterns and service 
price it offers. The provider who submits the bid leading to lowest total customer cost 
wins the auction and has to be prepared to deliver the service as described in the RfP, 






6.2 Conducting the Procurement Auction 
We now briefly describe the procurement auction. 
1. Definition of service incident types (customer): For the service in question, the 
customer formally describes the different business-relevant types of service inci-
dents including their corresponding sets of attributes. Further, the specific value 
range of each attribute is defined. 
2. Definition of service incident levels (customer): The customer divides the value 
range of each attribute (characterizing a single service incident type) into a set of 
disjoint intervals. Therefore, the endpoints of each interval are defined in a way that 
attribute values leading to significantly different adverse business impacts are ele-
ments of different intervals. Then, the customer calculates the Cartesian product of 
the different sets of attribute intervals for each service incident type, i.e., all service 
incident levels to be considered are defined. 
Example: The service incident type ‘reduced throughput incident’ is characterized 
by the two attributes ‘duration of throughput reduction’ (measured in minutes) and 
‘degree of throughput reduction’ (measured in percent) with the value ranges (0;c] 
and (0;z]. Considering the negative business impact of different attribute value 
combinations the customer now divides the range of the duration interval into 
three parts – (0;a), [a;b) and [b;c] – and the range of the degree interval into four 
parts – (0;w), [w;x), [x;y) and [y;z]. Calculating the Cartesian product of these 
two sets of attribute intervals, twelve service incident levels (3 x 4) are defined.  
This step is repeated for all types of service incidents of the service in question.  
3. Business cost assessment (customer): The customer considers the negative busi-
ness impacts, which service incidents at the different service incident levels (SIL) 
might cause, and assesses these monetarily. Consequently, for each service incident 
type the customer specifies a BusinessCost/SIL vector stating the business cost for 
each SIL defined in step 2. That is, the (discrete) business cost function regarding 
each service incident type is defined. 
4. Invitation of providers (customer): The customer invites a number of selected 
providers to take part in the procurement auction and sends the RfP including the 
business cost functions to these trusted suppliers.  
5. Definition of bids (providers): According to the procedure introduced in the previ-
ous section, each provider determines the characteristic incident patterns (one pat-
tern for each service incident type) for the SDE it wants to offer. Furthermore, it 
calculates the expected penalty and benefit payments it assumes to have to pay / re-
ceive. Due to the competitive auction setting the providers will add / subtract these 
expected values to / from the net service price. That is, the resulting gross service 
price reflects all expected cash flows. 
6. Bidding (providers): The providers submit their sealed bids, i.e., tuples of service 
incident patterns and service price, to the customer. 
7. Winner determination (customer): Among all service offers the customer identi-
fies the bid resulting in the lowest total customer cost. Therefore, the customer mul-
tiplies the absolute frequencies for service incidents at certain SILs to occur as stat-
ed in the service incident patterns (first part of a provider bid) with its 






sulting business cost value to the gross service price (second part of a provider bid) 
and, thus, determines the total customer cost. 
The provider bid winning the procurement auction determines the total customer cost 
(fixed value), since the winning provider has to compensate the customer for negative 
deviations from the service incident pattern offered but is rewarded for positive devia-
tions as well. If the provider is rewarded, on the customer’s side business cost are 
avoided in the same amount. Thus, the winning provider is rewarded if the service in 
question is delivered at a higher quality than stated in the service incident patterns, 
and is penalized if realized service quality is lower. 
7 Conclusion and Outlook 
To summarize, we have addressed a service customer’s optimization problem of iden-
tifying and selecting a cost-optimal service offer meeting the required level of service 
criticality and assuming typically non-linear business impact behavior.  
First, we analyzed the information that SLA decisions are typically based upon 
and illustrated deficiencies in the service level indicators usually used today. With 
regard to our first research question, we showed that the traditional (min, max) indica-
tor regime for measuring service performance is not sufficient to support proper deci-
sion making by the customer in case of quantified negative business impact to devel-
op non-linearly with service quality. Furthermore, we discussed how providers’ pri-
vate information about the behavior of service delivery environments could be lever-
aged by the customer when selecting service offers. 
 In order to address our second research question, we developed a procedure ena-
bling customers to solve their optimization problem – given different service offers – 
using a procurement auction. Our proposed seven-step auction approach enables pro-
viders to calculate business cost measures and, thus, to predict their services’ quanti-
fied negative business impact using the customer’s business cost estimates. Thus, 
providers can tailor service offers according to customers’ business requirements and 
serve their clients’ needs more profoundly. Using the information contained in the 
customer’s business cost functions as the basis for penalty and bonus rules, providers 
are free to balance resources they use to deliver a service. Moreover, the application 
of our procedure enables the customer to compare service offers regarding their ex-
pected adverse business impact and, thus, to select the total customer cost-optimal 
solution of its optimization problem – in case of linear and non-linear business cost 
functions.  
Having put forward our approach, we are well aware of a number of limitations 
and challenges. First, we assumed providers are able to determine the discrete inci-
dent attribute value distributions (e.g., regarding outage lengths) when using specific 
service delivery environments. In order to demonstrate this capability, we are current-
ly working on a data mining approach using monitoring data. Second, we assumed the 
customer is able to determine its business cost functions for all types of service inci-
dents. We realize that a precise determination of business cost functions may be diffi-






decision about the service offer to purchase has to be made based on information 
about business cost. Even a rough estimate of business cost functions might signifi-
cantly improve a decision with regard to total customer cost. Third, we assumed pro-
viders to be risk-neutral. This allows us the simplification of adding expected penal-
ties to and subtracting expected bonus payments from the net service price when de-
fining service offers, i.e., without adding risk premiums. This should be a realistic 
assumption at least for large providers supporting numerous, heterogeneous custom-
ers as they can spread and diversify their risk. In addition, we assumed that for non-
mission-critical, yet non-commodity services, providers will accept a ‘1:1 penalty 
rate’ as well as a ‘1:1 bonus rate’. These rates ensure that business cost information 
contained in providers’ offers is not distorted when service prices are defined and that 
providers have no incentive to state service incident patterns untruthfully. The penalty 
rate will be accepted by providers, since they can add all expected penalties to the 
service price. In future work we plan to analyze the influence of different provider 
risk preferences on the solution of the customer optimization problem. Finally, we 
assumed the customer to reveal its business cost functions, which indicate the critical-
ity of the service for its business. The competition among providers, which participate 
in the procurement auction, will prevent them from taking advantage of this infor-
mation and claiming the complete consumer surplus, which results from different 
service quality and service price combinations, leading to specific total customer cost. 
We are convinced that our approach, enabling customers to compare different ser-
vice offers and to select the cost-optimal service solution, provides valuable insights 
for both, service providers and their customers. It will help both parties to address the 
challenge of business and IT alignment in a different way – exploiting analytical in-
sights gained for service delivery environments. At the same time, the limitations 
mentioned above leave a broad field for further research. 
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